contested on constitutional grounds. 2 Post Civil War philosophy in regard to educational segregation found expression in United States v. Buntin, where a United States Circuit Court held that so long as educational advantages for Negroes were in all respects "substantially equal" to those provided for white, no' denial of equal protection resulted. 3 When this issue was finally presented to the Supreme Court, the rule of the Buntin case was upheld. 4 The court relied upon Plessy v. Ferguson, 5 now recognized as the classic case upholding the power of a state legislature to separate the white and colored races.
Having committed themselves to a standard of "substantial equality," the courts became faced with the difficulty of interpreting it. Some courts reluctantly conceded that "substantial equality" permitted many inequalities. As late as 1937 a court brushed aside a charge of unconstitutional discrimination against colored children who, having taken and passed high school admittance examinations, were denied admission because of race and color. Similar suits to remove inequities had been none too successful, 7 "NELsoN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE 1920, p. 112 (1946) , indicates that Amd. XIV and Art IV, sec. 2 were Invoked. The equal protection clause has become, however, the almost universal ground upon which educational segregation issues have been fought out.
3 10 Fed. 730 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1882). Many later cases have been Interpreted as laying down a rule that a state may furnish "separate but equal" educational facilities for Negroes. The two expressions are synonymous.
Cummings v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
See also Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) , where the Supreme Court again affirmed the Buntin rule.
' 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The court emphasized that segregation was not a white judgment of colored inferiority nor was It discriminatory to restrict Negroes to colored sections. 34 MiNN. L. REV. 289 (1950) reprints a brief of the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education attacking basic doctrine of the Plessy case; Cf. Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 629 (1949) .
8 Williams v. Zimmerman, 172 Md. 152, 192 Atl. 353 (1937): "Possibly there might be, under some circumstances, Inequalities encountered In dealing with the two races separately that would render the maintenance of the separation inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of equal protection of the laws, but the allowance of separate treat. ment at all involves allowance of some incidental differences." 7 NE.soN, supra., note 2 at 112 et seq.
and continued to fail until complaints concentrating upon segregation in the top echelons of education were brought to the courts.
H. The Change to Equality in Fact
Prior to 1935, court action invoking the Fourteenth Amendment in questions of educational opportunities for Negroes placed little or no emphasis upon provisions for collegiate, graduate and professional studies. 8 In 1935, however, a young Negro resident of Baltimore sued for writ of mandamus to compel authorities of the University of Maryland to admit him to the law school. In holding that the petitioner was entitled to admission, 9 the state court looked at the Maryland out-of-state scholarship act 10 and decided that such scholarships did not give substantially equal educational opportunities to the Negro students receiving them. It was then but a step for the United States Supreme Court to reach the same result despite a declaration of intent by the affected state to establish an equal law school for Negroes." The Gaines decision, therefore, em-8 Ibid. For a contention that by 1930 Negro students were graduating from American colleges in sufficient numbers to spotlight the general absence of such facilities in southern states, see JOHNSON, THE NEGRO COLLEGE GRADUATE (1938) . In 1944 a nation wide survey disclosed that nine southern states made no provisions whatsoever for graduate or professional training for Negroes despite the fact that such was provided at public expense for white students. United States Office of Education, National Survey of Higher Education for Negroes (1944) .
0 Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936) . 20 Such scholarship acts usually provided for the payment of tuition fees for Negro students, who attended universities outside the state for courses offered to white students at the state university from which Negroes were excluded by law.
11 Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 346 (1938): "... it appears that the policy of establishing a law school at Lincoln University has not yet ripened into an actual establishment, and it cannot be said that a mere declaration of purpose, still unfulfilled, is enough." Mo. Rev. Stat., 9622 provides in part: 1... Whenever the board of curators deem it advisable they shall have the power to open any necessary school or department." This clause was enacted pursuant to the establishment of the Missouri out-of-state scholarship fund under this section. The Gaines case expressly invalidated such enactments and cited with approval the Murray case, supra., note 9.
phasized that "substantial equality," at least on the graduate and professional level, would require the actual maintenance of separate graduate schools established for the sole use of interested and qualified Negro students.
Some states attempted to solve the problem presented by the Gaines decision through measures to provide graduate instruction within the state for colored scholars. 12 But such efforts created new woes. While it was once contended that the cost of duplicate facilities might be offset by the alleged fact that Negroes require less than whites or more willingly do without, such a conclusion was belied by statistics indicating higher per capita expenditures for Negro than for white students. 13 Skyrocketing educational Apr. 27, 1941) it Is mentioned that estimates of the cost necessary to establish educational equality as between Negroes and whites in the South had ranged from an additional $400,000 per year to a total of $56,000,000. 11 Missouri has maintained an all-Negro law school at Lincoln continuously since 1939, in compliance with the Supreme Court ruling in the Gaines case, despite the fact that the peak attendance has been 35 students and in one year (1943) no students were enrolled. Wheildon, op cit., note 12. The University of Texas maintains a separate law school for Negroes which had a total enrollment of only 23 students in 1950 . See Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W. 2d 442, 444 (1948 Not content with a disapproval of physical inequalities, the Chief Justice stressed the significance of certain subjective attributes like reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of alumni and standing in the community. 2 0 In the unanimous opinion of the court the University of Texas Law School possessed to "a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school."
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Had the court definitely discarded "substantial equality" in favor of the new standard, "equality in fact?" As if to dispel any uncertainty which might have clouded the Sweatt decision, the court on the same day decided McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents. 22 A Negro citizen of Oklahoma, possessing a master's degree, had been admitted to the graduate school of the University of Oklahoma. In compliance with state law he had been assigned, however, to a special seat in the classroom, and to special tables in the cafeteria and library. Such action, said the court, is not equality of treatment because:
"[These restrictions] signify that the State, in administering the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from the other students . . . Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and in general to learn his profession. ' 23 Unquestionably, "equality in fact" necessitated a new educational propinquity. Nor was the enunciation of the "fact" standard a completely novel step, for lower Federal courts = Id. at 641.
had previously followed a similar line of reasoning when finding discrimination in public swimming poo 2 4 and golf course 2 .
5 cases. The Sweatt and McLaurin decisions, therefore, were closely examined by the federal courts, and a not surprising conclusion was quickly and succinctly drawn: ".... equality of the races means equality in fact and not in theory. '26 What had been before a general trend toward equality in fact wherever tax-provided institutions existed under a system of segregation had now become a rule of law.
M. The Incompatibility of Equality in Fact and Segregation
The current issue to be judicially determined is whether a state can meet the equality in fact test and still insist upon segregation in the upper levels of education. Few printed opinions exist to guide those who would survey the cases; moreover, it is questionable that another decision would create more than a ripple in already troubled waters. It has been pointed out, however, that the doctrine of the Plessy case has never been expressly overruled, 27 and, although agitation for such a holding has increased since the 3 The opinion stated that housing was inadequate at both institutions, but that when the Negro library building is converted into a law building, then housing facilities at each institution will be "substantially equal" for the number of students likely to attend the institutions.
1 Three paragraphs of the opinion are devoted to a discussion of North Carolina progress in maintaining segregated schools. A $4,000,-000 budget for improvements and an annual operating budget in excess of $1,000,000 are specifically mentioned.
18 The Negro professors at the Negro law school are referred to only as "well-qualified" law school graduates of colored law schools.
8 No mention is made of the administration except that it is headed by a full time dean.
I" This criterion emphasized in the Sweatt case, was discussed in one statement: "Its [the Negro law school's] applicants for admission to the bar are as successful in proportion to their number as those from the University of North Carolina or other law schools of the state." =' Dismissed in one sentence. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the decision of the district court was reversed. 41 This reversal was immediately interpreted to "make it impossible for any Southern State to bar otherwise qualified Negroes from white law schools, whether separate schools are provided or not. 42 It is undeniable that the strong language of the Court of Appeals-stressing as it did such intangible qualities as the character of the respective students, their social contacts and influence in the profession-rejected segregation in professional education. But the court's method of reaching that result left the Plessy doctrine of separate but equal facilities theoretically untouched. Nevertheless, insofar as the standard of equality in fact is concerned, segregation in professional education has been dealt a death blow. The North Carolina Negro law school is one of the most firmly established and highly regarded of the separate graduate schools for colored students. If it cannot meet the test, no other can! Tradition and prestige acquired by white universities over periods of time are evidently not attainable by segregated institutions.
Although a petition for certiorari will probably be filed, 48 the Court of Appeals emphasized that the case is not different in principle from Sweatt v. Painter. 4 4 Accordingly, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will feel that the case deserves detailed consideration.
Subsidiary Problems: If an assumption is made that the University of North Carolina will lose on appeal, there will be subsidiary problems arising from the admission of colored law students. white student dining hall. Since law students and undergraduates receive meals in the same dining hall at the state university-and apparently the general public may also eat there-persons other than law students will be thrown into unaccustomed contact with Negroes. Whether these persons will accept such contacts as calmly as law students might is doubtful.
If it is imperative for purposes of professional contactas expressed in the McLaurin case 4 5 --that Negroes associate with their fellow white students, can this intimate association be restricted to eating and studying activities? Must not the university make available to the Negro law student the same dormitory facilities which house his white counterpart? The question of equality in dormitories is not the only housing problem. Presumably, married Negro law students seeking apartments in a white college community will be confronted with discriminatory practices which have drawn considerable comment in recent years. 46 What effect will the entrance of Negroes have upon social and fraternal organizations among law students at the University of North Carolina? If these groups are sponsored by the school and in any way integrated with its educational activities, would not they too be subject to the equality in fact test? These questions, unanswerable at present, indicate practical difficulties in administering the decree of the Court of Appeals, and suggest sociological ramifications extending beyond the boundaries of the law school and its student body.
Of greater legal significance are the constitutional difficulties the University of North Carolina may encounter if it limits the admission of Negroes to "residents" of the state. 47 and enter other professions, the possibility of basing a suit on the privileges and immunities clause seems remote.
Equally unfeasible is the contention that the "privileges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could aid the non-resident Negro plaintiff. That clause protects The theory of the La Tourette case is that some residents might be non-citizens and some citizens might be non-residents; therefore, a distinction between residents and non-residents is not the same as the prohibited distinction between citizens and non-citizens. In the Douglas case overcrowded court dockets justified the discrimination against non-residents.
" In re Rodgers, 194 Pa. 161, 46 Atl. 668 (1899).
only those privileges or immunities that belong to citizens of the United States as distinguished from citizens of the states ;5 and the privilege of attending a university as a student comes not from federal sources but is given by the state.
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A more successful approach for the frustrated non-resident Negro might be through the equal protection clause. He would be especially concerned with the meaning of the phrase "within the jurisdiction", for only those persons within the jurisdiction of the state may invoke the equal protection provision. Among the most liberal interpretations of that phrase is that of the Supreme Court in Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 5 7 where a state statute requiring full examination of nonresident corporations as a condition precedent to suit in the state was held invalid. Since the non-resident corporation's attempt to sue brought it within the jurisdiction of the state, it would seem that the presence in North Carolina of a non-resident Negro seeking admission to the university law school would be sufficient to invoke the equal protection clause. And perhaps the submission of an application to the university authorities-a step similar to the filing of a complaint in the court of another state-would bring the applicant "within the jurisdiction". If the non-resident applicant is within the jurisdiction of North Carolina, is he not denied equal protection by a refusal to admit him to the law school when non-resident white applicants, similarly situated and similarly qualified, are occasionally admitted? Proof of discrimination could be furnished by declarations of university officials and by an enrollment record showing systematic exclusion of non-resident Negroes.
Unlike the equal protection clause, due process under the Fourteenth Amendment must be afforded "any person," although he may not be "within the jurisdiction." The nonresident Negro applicant could contend that discrimination in handling applications based solely on race (if he can prove it) is per se unreasonable and arbitarary state action and that such state action is a deprivation of "liberty" without "due process of law." Administrative and Legislative Approaches: In six main proposals 58 the President's Committee on Civil Rights has attacked the problem of segregation. For the first time in a governmental document, 59 segregation is frankly condemned as a denial of equal educational opportunity, and it has been suggested that this report reflects the majority sentiment of the American people. 60 Congress is the designated medium through which the Committee would eliminate many of the inequalities discovered, but whether or not Congress may so act depends upon certain constitutional limitations.
One writer argues that the enabling clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 61 may allow Congress to increase the area of Civil Rights protection. 62 If one concedes that Congress under this clause can act to remove inequalities, it would nevertheless seem that many inequalities in education, at least on the graduate level, can be eliminated by judicial action alone through test suits brought by such organizations as the NAACP. Of course, Congress, like the courts, presumably has power to deal only with state action; any legislative effort to cover private activity might lead to unconstitutionality.
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To Secure These Rights, Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, (1947) . The proposals are: (1) strengthening the right to safety and security of the person, (2) strengthening the right to citizenship and its privileges, (3) strengthening the right to equality of opportunity, (4) strengthening the machinery for the protection of civil rights, (5) strengthening the right to freedom of conscience and expression, and (6) a long term campaign of public education to inform the people of the civil rights to which they are entitled and which they owe one another. On the undergraduate and high school level, Congressional efforts might accelerate the erasure of race distinctions. The real question is whether (in the event that equality in fact is found to exist between segregated schools) Congress can intervene in favor of the Negro to supersede the determination of the courts and enforce its own view of equality. What weight will the courts have to give to a Congressional determination, which derives its authority from the enabling clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that educational facilities are unequal? The Amendment seems designed to prevent state authorities from discriminating but not to allow federal authorities to impose upon the states their own notions of what will create better harmony between the races. In other words, the mandate to Congress under the enabling clause is to strike at abuses produced by state authorities rather than to supersede judicial decisions allowing "separate but equal" facilities or to utilize state agencies to foster federal goals. These observations must be absorbed, however, with the knowledge that Congress does not seem presently inclined to deal with educational segregation.
The chief impact of educational segregation upon congressional action may be through the argument that Congress should not give federal aid to segregated schools. 63 Perhaps, too, Congress may be influenced to incorporate into its grants and government contracts with southern colleges certain anti-discrimination provisions. Increased government grants during the present emergency might provide more leverage for such a measure; on the other hand, times of crisis are seldom vehicles for purposive social reform. At all events, congressional action of significance, though unlikely, is not definitely precluded.
Where Congress has not acted, three state legislatures have. Prior to the Sweatt and McLaur'in decisions there 3 Chiefly on the ground that segregation is intrinsically uneconomical and that segregated school systems should reduce expenses by abolishing segregation before asking for federal funds.
An analogy is furnished by the Wash-Healey Act providing minimum wage standards for government contracts. Educational associations may also have some voice in settling the discrimination issue. 86 The American Council on Education has adopted an affirmative program s7 including the following basic points:
(1) Development of a program by the colleges themselves that would eliminate such discrimination, (2) Enactment of legislation wherever necessary. U Under this plan a Board of Control for Regional Education is set up. Its membership consists of the governors of the states in the plan and three additional appointees of each governor. Executive offices are in Atlanta, Ga., each staff contributing to the expenses required. Under the staff's direction are several consultative commissions composed of specialists for the specific area of activity concerned; these commissions supply the needs of the region. All decisions are made by the Board of Control and must be approved subsequently by the legislatures of the states. See Report on Discrimination, supra., note 81, pp. 40-42.
ss Ibid. 8 It has been suggested that segregation is rapidly on the way out and that consequently Negro institutions in general will be weakened and many will die because states will put their money into non-segregated institutions. This observation was prompted by the refusal of the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools to allow the Negro colleges of the region to become members. Richmond Times Dispatch, p. 2, (Dec. 5, 1950 There is evidence that the pressure exerted by educational organizations may become coercive if a member of the association refuses to abolish segregation, e.g. the proposal by the American Association of Law Schools of a resolution which requires the abolition of segregation by member schools as a condition of membership. 8 8 Presumably, this requirement would extend to both private and public schools. But these associations are at most confederations unable to enforce effectively their own pronouncements; on the other hand, whatever force they can muster is another thorn in the side of segregated schools.
Attitudes of Southern University Professors and Students:
Unquestionably, the reaction of professors and students to the conflict between equality in fact and segregation will be reflected in future university action. A recent poll of southern college and university professors, completed in December of 1950, revealed that seven out of every ten teachers who replied favored immediate admission of Negroes to the graduate and professional schools of the South, without segregation. 8 of the total replies favored no segregation. Only Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina professors failed to vote overwhelmingly for equality in fact as opposed to segregation.
10 Ballots were sent to approximately 15,000 teachers in 14 southern institutions. Some 3,442 usable replies were received. Of these, 3134-91%-were from teachers in 130 "white" institutions and 288-9%-were from teachers in 25 "Negro" institutions. The trend in this poll approximated very closely the results of a similar poll of "white" state university teachers in 1948. Although the ballots stated that signatures were optional, 77% of the returns were signed, and 53% gave written reasons for their choices. A selected number of these comments are reprinted in JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATION, supra., note 89, pp. 122-133.
Any poll of this sort must be discounted to some degree. For one thing, many violently anti-segregation professors might dislike all alternatives and decide to throw away the ballot. Moreover, those who did not reply may have been apathetic, but if pressed, would have chosen one of the other three alternatives. Finally, in determining which replies were "usable" a selectivity factor may have operated upon the conductors of the poll. choice of four plans 9 ' providing for more equal educational opportunities for Negroes in these fields. Although these professors comprised the faculties of private schools, it has been pointed out that a similar survey of state university professors revealed approximately the same results.
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Perhaps the inclination toward segregation diminishes in the higher intellectual strata; if so, then those instructors who will be most affected by the entrance of Negroes into graduate schools are those most willing to accept them.
Observers have noted that white students have accepted the admission of Negro students without rancor or violence.
3 At the University of Mississippi, however, the student newspaper editor took the unprecedented liberty of advocating the admission of Negro students. Brief resentment flared up; a burning cross in front of his window rewarded the editor's efforts.
9 4 Notwithstanding this incident, a large scale student racial clash is not likely to occur where Negroes are admitted to graduate schools in small numbers. The more serious problems will arise when and if colored students flock to the state universities en masse. Yet if the students are willing to accept Negro classmates, university policies may change accordingly.
11 Plan A-Open existing graduate and professional schools to Negroes without segregation. 2,412 of the total votes cast favored this plan. 68% of these teachers were from white Institutions; teachers in Negro colleges voted 97 % for the plan. Plan B-Open existing graduate schools with segregation. This possibility received only 88, or 3 % of the total votes.
Plan C-Establish new graduate schools for Negroes. This plan was the least favored of all. It received only 2 % of the votes.
Plan D-The Southern Governors' Plan to establish regional segregated schools for Negroes; it received 842 votes-24.5 %.
0 JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATION, supra., note 89, p. 118. 1 ADA World, supra., note 71. 0, Ibid. This incident was reported as a mild one. Delegates to the Southern Law Review Conference held in Knoxville, Tenn., April 13, 1951, insisted nevertheless that the display was somewhat violent. It must be recognized that many of the periodicals and newspapers cited are Negro-owned or Negro-supported, and that the view taken may place the colored student in a favorable position.
IV. Extension of Equality in Fact to Private Institutions
Since the present clash between segregation and equality in fact exists principally with regard to state-supported universities, it may be said that McKissak v. Carmichael for all practical purposes legally eliminates segregation in state graduate schools. Accordingly, state universities may expect a shift in student enrollment with colored registrants seeking the traditionally more treasured degrees of the nonsegregated state university curriculum and with dissatisfied white students seeking the more restrictive confines of the private university.
Some private institutions may be licking their chops at the thought that white students may be shunted to them from public ones as a result of the admission of Negroes to state schools. In a speech before the South Carolina Education Association, Governor James Byrnes of South Carolina expanded this idea when he asserted that public schools may be abandoned in favor of private ones if segregation in public schools is barred 5 While this view may be extreme, the probability that private universities are to become quite involved in the segregation question nevertheless suggests itself.
A. State Action:
Before it is concluded that the private institution can refuse to admit Negro applicants, it would be well to examine the meaning of "private" and ask whether recent decisions have or have not expanded state action to include the activity of universities usually thought of as 15 Columbia State, p. 1 (March 17, 1951) . The governor's address was prompted by a segregation suit which will be argued May 28, 1951 in the federal court at Charleston, S.C. His idea seemed to be that education should be turned over to parochial schools. Undoubtedly, this would create new problems as to separation of church and state. Moreover, this state delegation of the sphere of education to parochial schools might not escape the argument that those schools had themselves become public. An analogy is found in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) , where South Carolina attempted to preserve the white primary by turning its election machinery over to the Democratic party; the court held that the party was to be considered a state Instrumentality and its discrimination involved state action. See also Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 287 (4th Cir., 1947 Discrimination originating with the state may be found in the actions of state officials, in the exercise of state-conferred power and in performance of a state function. It would seem from the decisions that any discriminatory action by any state official or by any instrumentality of the state legislative, executive or judicial branches will constitute state originated discrimination. But this type of state action goes beyond the functioning of the three branches of state government. A corporation's performance of a state function in maintaining a "company town" may also lead to discrimination originating with the state.
99 As a major premise, then, it may be noted that the doctrine of discriminatory action originated by the state itself is an expanding one.
Some of the recent cases involve an extension of state action to include discrimination by private associations and groups, the state taking no part in the original discrimina- tion. Thus, in Rice v. Elmore"° a political party was held to be no longer a private enterprise but to have becomebecause of its importance to the electorate--"imbedded in the election machinery of the country . . ."101 Although this case has been said to stand for the proposition that a state cannot idly allow a political party to discriminate, 102 there is evidence that South Carolina had actually entered into the original discrimination. 0 3 For this reason, a more recent decision declaring that state judicial enforcement of racial covenants is state action represents the broadest application of the Fourteenth Amendment in this field. Although the discrimination in Shelley v. Kraemer 0 4 originated in private covenants, state enforcement of those covenants is prohibited because:
"State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertion of state power in all forms. And when the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of this court to enforce the constitutional commands." 0 5
Carried to a theoretical extreme the doctrine of state action might be limitless, so that every action within the state would be state action. Hobbes maintained that the 103 In 1944 the Supreme Court had held in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, that the right to vote in a primary election held under state law might not be denied on the ground of race or color. Immediately following this decision, the then Governor of South Carolina convened the state legislature and recommended that it repeal all laws with relation to primaries with the avowed purpose of preventing voting by Negroes in the Democratic primaries of the state. Pursuant to this recommendation, the primary laws of the state were repealed and the Democratic primary was conducted thereafter under rules prescribed by the Democratic party. See Rice v. Elmore, supra., note 11, p. 388.
2-334 U.S. 1 (1948 Corporate Charters: To cite only one example Duke University, a privately-endowed institution, obtained its corporate charter under the constitution l ss and laws 0 9 of North Carolina. Since a corporate charter entitles a group to 2 Art. VIII, § 1 of the Const. of North Carolina provides: "No corporation shall be created nor shall its charter be extended, altered, or amended by special act, except corporations for charitable, educational, penal, or reformatory purposes that are to be and remain under the patronage and control of the State; but the General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the chartering and organization of all corporations and for amending, extending and forfeitures of all charters, except those above permitted by special act. All such general laws and special acts may be altered from time to time or repealed; and the General Assembly may at any time by special act repeal the charter of any corporation."
"I See N.C. G.S., § 55-2, relating to the formation and organization of corporations.
existence and the right to sue-the awarding of such privileges is obviously state action. It is arguable, then, that any discrimination practiced by the university is discrimination originating with the state by means of the grant of the corporate charter. The piercing question, of course, is whether the acts of the university in discriminating against Negroes are acts properly classified as flowing from state conferred power. If it can be shown that such university action is actually an exercise of state conferred power, or is the action of a state instrumentality, then the discrimination can be attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment.
An argument which implies that the activity of a corporation is state action must of necessity be a drastic one, if the basis of such an argument is the issuance of a corporate charter. Particularly is it extreme as applied to a private university.. The privilege of limited liability is of less value to universities than to profit-conscious corporations because the university is not engaged in activities that are likely to create tort liabilities. As to the privilege of perpetual existence, the same advantage might be obtained without incorporation by establishing a charitable trust to carry on university activities. 110 The awarding of these privileges to educational institutions, therefore, should not be viewed dogmatically as a grant of state power."' Tax Exemptions and Subsidies: It has been suggested that a privately endowed classical college has become almost a government university by virtue of the tax and subsidy status allowed these institutions by the federal and state I5 N.C. G.S., § § 105-296 (1950): "The following real property, and no other, shall be exempted from taxation: (4) Buildings, with the land actually occupied, wholly devoted to educational purposes, belonging to, actually and exclusively occupied and used for public libraries, colleges, academies, industrial schools, seminaries, or any other institution of learning, together with such additional adjacent land owned by such libraries and educational institutions as may be reasonably necessary for the convenient use of such building, and also buildings thereon used as residences by the officers or instructors of such educational institutions."
-N.C. G.S., § § 105-188 (1950): "It is expressly provided, however, that the tax levied in this article shall not apply to so much of said property as shall so pass exclusively: (2) to or for the exclusive benefit of charitable, education, or religious organizations located within this State, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." Cf. N.C. G.S. § 105-147(9) (1950) (income tax deduction for charitable contribution).
110 This statement can be confirmed by any alumnus who has received university pleas for gifts to meet additional expenses.
-N.C. G.S., § § 105-164 to 105-187 (1950).
lends strong support to the argument that the state thereby "subsidizes" private institutions.
The usual understanding of subsidy is that the term refers not to an exemption but to a specific grant from the government to aid the educational program. 11 8 An excellent example of this definition is the annual appropriation of federal funds to endow and maintain state agricultural and mechanical colleges. 119 Federal funds are also made available to private universities, but the suggestion that those schools are being subsidized is dispelled by the financial statements of those institutions. The Duke University Financial Report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950, showed that no revenues of any sort were received from the state and that total receipts from the federal government amounted to only 8% (approximate) of total revenue.1 20 The United States Government specified each project to be undertaken with the funds, which were distributed on either ings presents an additional possibility through which the discrimination of private universities can be brought within the scope of "state action." There is no legal doubt that the action of state courts and judicial officers in their
The university, upon completion of the designated project, is reimbursed by the government for the actual cost of performing the contract. To the extent that private institutions are doing govern. ment work on this basis, the institution is subsidizing the government. Chief benefits to the private institution could only be in terms of spreading overhead and avoiding cut-backs. Whether these advantages exist will depend on what is considered "cost" under the contract. If there is no appreciable reduction of overhead and other operating expenses and if no other benefit is derived from the government contract, then the subsidy argument falls.
'"
A sum is granted to accelerate a university program already under way. See 7 U.S.C.A., supra., note 119. Such funds are applied to the development of the part of the program which the government designates.
official capacities is to be regarded as action of the state.
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This issue is closed. But is a state court's refusal to consider tort claims against charitable institutions, such as private universities which refuse to admit Negroes, a state enforcement of privately originating discrimination? If the act of a state court, "in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is the act of the State,"' 124 it is arguable that the adherence of a state court to the common law doctrine of charitable immunity 1 2 5 is a construction and enforcement of state law which, when applied to a discriminating university, involves state enforcement of private discrimination. A close reading of the Shelley case, however, suggests a caveat. As the court pointed out there, "The difference between judicial enforcement and non-enforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference to petitioners between being denied rights of property available to other members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing.' 12 0 The analogy from this case to denial of a tort suit against a private university which discriminates in its selection of students is incomplete. In the latter situation the judicial interpretation affects in no wise the barred student, but instead only precludes recognition of the rights of the tort claimant. Consequently, despite the benefit to the university from the precluding of expensive judgments, tort immunity seems insufficient to invoke the rationale of Shelley v. Kraemer. Public Utility: Application of the equality in fact theory to private universities through an extended concept of state originated discrimination raises one final possibility. It is arguable that education is affected with a public interest and so closely tied to the welfare of the state that any educational institution within the state is, in effect, a public utility.
127 It is then suggested that because of the state's power to regulate a public utility, the private university is effectively reduced to a subsidiary of the state. Private handling of a state function (education) is involved, and any discrimination practiced by the private university becomes state originated. The public utility argument would be especially strong in the lower strata of education; some rudimentary education would seem essential to the performance of the role of citizenship, for, without it, one is not qualified to vote or adequately to serve the country. On the other hand, advanced education, while desirable, is not as imperative either from the point of view of the state or of the individual. And so it would be difficult to apply the public utility notion to a private university.
Perhaps the public utility concept would afford a state legislature constitutional authority for passing a fair educational practices act. Such an act would merely enforce the common law obligation of a public utility to give -nondiscriminatory service to all. But it is questionable that the failure to pass such a statute can be state originated (1945) . In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), the court suggested that many "private" businesses so substantially affect the community that the law considers them "public" for the purposes of state regulation.
discrimination. Under a view that state inaction can be action, the judiciary would have to overturn any legislative choice of a "hands-off" approach and undertake an extensive program to remove discrimination by judicial decree. The problem of judicial administration of such a court-created fair educational practice act is another reason for favoring a narrower view of state originated discrimination.
The approaches suggested in bringing discrimination by private universities within the realm of state action are both interesting and varied. State originated discrimination is not a static concept, nor is state enforcement of private discrimination limited in its application. Although judicial expansion of either view may change the law at present, state action under the Fourteenth Amendment apparently does not require private universities to change their policies to meet the equality in fact test.
B. Anti-Trust Laws :128
The Fourteenth Amendment is not the only medium through which equality in fact can be extended to private institutions. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce among the states or foreign nations.1 29 A statute prohibiting restraints of "trade or commerce" does not at first suggest a protection of civil liberties; yet it has been advanced that this implication is derived from Magna Charta, 180 and such a view has been discussed in the courts. m Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., ll U.S. 746 (1884) at 757: "The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore, be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The right to pursue them, without let or hindrance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of all citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright." Compare Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). a continual widening of the area embraced by the statutory prohibition against restraint of trade 32 with the result that the bounds within which the statute is to operate are set by the standard of harm to the common good, 13 3 as well as by the economic freedom of the individual. By an even more liberal construction of the anti-trust laws it has been argued that discrimination stemming from private groups in control of higher educational facilities falls within the statutory grasp of the Sherman Act. 34 If the argument is sound, the board of trustees of a privately endowed college which denies admission to Negroes may find itself to be a group which has "conspired to restrain trade or commerce."
To invoke the anti-trust laws, however, a plaintiff must find some right infringed which is protected by the act. A private university which discriminates in its choice of students cannot be attacked unless it has contracted, combined or conspired "in restraint of trade or commerce." One may concede that there is a right to an education, 85 and that private universities are often guilty of discrimination, 36 but it nevertheless does not follow that the deprivation of an educational right is a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Unquestionably, there is sufficient group activity in the action of a private university board of trustees to support It has been asserted that in the East a majority of application blanks used by colleges continued to include discriminatory questions which bore no relation to educational qualifications. See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Anti-Semitism in the United States in 1947, p. 28 (1948 Either the Board of Trustees or the university corporation could probably be brought within the act, if sufficient restraint of trade or conspiracy could be found.
"s Applying equality in fact to private institutions by means of the anti-trust laws is not completely precluded by the foregoing analysis. Notice has been taken that higher education is becoming Increasingly important as the primary stepping stone to the making of a livelihood. See Marcus, supra., note 128, at 208. This is especially true In the professions. Graduation from an accredited law school Is often a requisite for admission to a state bar association. Misc. 441, 149 N.Y. Supp. 6 (1941) . It Is feasible, therefore, to conclude that the exclusion of Negroes from a professional association is a conspiracy in restraint of trade. See Marcus, i d4e. Since private graduate and professional schools contribute greatly to the flow of prospective professional practitioners from universities to careers, it may be possible to trace the "pattern of discrimination" from the private association to the private university and then to apply the Sherman Act.
